The+Drug+War

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__Overview__
The Mexican Drug War is an ongoing conflict of escalating violence fought by drug cartels against each other and against the Mexican government. The war's death toll continues to rise as murders, decapitations, and kidnappings have become more prevalent; on a wider scale, a corrupt military and police force and ineffective judiciary exacerbate the problem. President Felipe Calderon has tried to combat the violence of the cartels by deploying the military, cooperating with the United States, and undertaking other public security reforms. However, despite some signs of progress, the fight against the organized crime groups entrenched in Mexico will prove to be a long and bloody one.



Since his election in 2006, President Felipe Calderon has vowed to crack down on illegal drug trafficking and drug related violence. The following is a list of his initiatives: -__the military offensive__: with much of the police force infiltrated by corruption, Calderon deployed the military (around 45,000 troops total) in eighteen states to seize and destroy contraband, conduct raids, and establish order on the streets. The military is one of the most respected institutions in Mexico and it has likely succeeded in improving basic citizen safety, but overall the strategy has failed to seriously disrupt the drug trade, while it has simultaneously exposed the army to the same corruption that permeated the police. -__interdiction and eradication__: Mexico is increasingly targeting the sources of drug production, attacking labs and intercepting shipments. -__streamlining federal security forces__: a 2008 constitutional reform merged the PFP (responsible for maintaining public order without any investigative capabilities) and the AFI (an intelligence-gathering unit similar to the FBI), an effort to increase coordination and efficiency between anti-trafficking officials. -__public security reforms__: Calderon has introduced new security institutions such as a national criminal database and a department to oversee corruption in the police force. __-judicial reforms__: Calderon passed constitutional reforms in an effort to speed up criminal procedures. Oral trials replaced a time-consuming written trial method, while a special group of judges can now rule quickly on requests for search warrants. -__the Merida Initiative__: a 2007 counter-narcotics agreement between Calderon and President Bush. The three-year, $1.5 billion allocates money toward purchasing military equipment for Mexico, expanding its telecommunications structure and ability to control airspace, training its police force, and providing technology to its law enforcement agencies. However, the initiative does not address the demand for drugs within the U.S., which is a major cause of the war in the first place; it also does not address the prevalent weapons trade that takes place across the porous border.
 * __Current Policy__**



Overall, the effects of Calderon's extensive set of anti-trafficking policies are mixed. There are some signs of progress: seizures and arrests have increased since Calderon took office. However, much of the immediate aftermath has been negative. The //de facto// arrangement that used to exist--drug traffickers would kill each other and the government would stay out of it--is no longer in place because of Calderon's active attempts at intervention. More and more officials are being targeted; deaths are becoming increasingly gruesome; and traffickers are transitioning from disorganized gangsters to narcoterrorists. Nevertheless, Calderon preaches patience, reminding citizens that the war on drugs will be a long one.

Nearly 60% of Mexicans think that the drug cartels are winning the war against the government; 65% of Mexicans say that the country is now //less// safe because of Calderon's strategies. Meanwhile, about half of all Mexicans believe that the next government to be elected in 2012 needs a change of strategy. These numbers are a startling indictment of the government's plan of action.
 * __Public Opinion__**

The 'No Mas Sangre' ('No More Blood') protest group has recently taken to the streets in opposition to what they perceive as Calderon's drug war. As it turns out, this protest group may accurately represent the views of the majority of Mexicans, as about half the population is fed up with Calderon's strategies. Video: []

The 'No Mas Sangre' group makes red imprints on the ground during their demonstrations to protest the government's actions in the drug war.

Much of public opinion is dictated by the media, which has recognized its important role. Recently Mexico's largest news outlets agreed to set rules for reporting the drug war, agreeing not to glorify the mission of drug traffickers or publish cartel propaganda. These self-policed guidelines will probably help keep the populace on the side of the government. Surprisingly, 15% of Mexicans see the cartels as heroes, and 40% see them as a source of employment, so this new policy by the media may end up being more important than one might imagine. []

Defeating the drug cartels in Mexico is obviously a bipartisan issue. However, the PRI has undoubtedly benefited from Calderon's failure to produce measurable results in the drug war. PAN and Calderon have seen the PRI regain control of the legislature, and the latter has performed well in recent elections, with a decent chance of even winning the presidency in 2012.
 * __Party Opinion__**

The PRI candidates who have performed well have not come out openly in favor of the drug war or in favor of the cartels. Rather, they have criticized Calderon's strategy, and been rewarded in the polls against PAN. The PRI's new leader, Humberto Moreira, claims that Calderon's efforts failed because of poor planning and lack of adequate resources; he especially advocates the deployment of more military forces. The PRI favors the formation of a more precise strategy, and more attention paid to the southern border. Moreira also believes that other critical social and economic problems--such as poverty, education, health care, and unemployment--contribute to the security problems and need to be dealt with. It remains to be seen whether the PRI is merely taking advantage of a political opportunity, or if they can legitimately offer constructive policy solutions.

The PRI has also criticized the current PAN administration's relationship with the U.S., including the Merida Initiative. The PRI has been wary of the U.S. weapons trade and demand for drugs, both of which are fueling the conflict in Mexico. Plus, under Calderon, the U.S. was able to operate an extensive spy network within Mexico, interrogate migrant workers crossing the border, and use a great deal of Mexican intelligence information, which the PRI has also been critical of. The two parties greatly disagree over how the relationship between the two countries should be handled.

Rule of law: the most basic and far-reaching implication of the drug war in Mexico is the collapse of basic rule of law, one of the necessary qualities for an established democracy to develop. The number of drug-related homicides is rising, and those deaths are becoming increasingly horrifying--even government officials have been targeted. The police are corrupt and guilty of human rights violations. Equality before the law is a farce; the judiciary is infiltrated by bribery and cannot be relied upon. Elections have been marred by fraud and corruption. Basic stability in Mexico has fallen apart and rule of law is rapidly disappearing.
 * __Implications__**

Free press: reporters have been kidnapped and killed, and even some offices have been attacked. Journalists are unable to investigate the cartel violence without fearing for their lives, and freedom of press--another basic requirement for an established democracy--has been severely jeopardized.

The economy: the violence is obviously destabilizing the economic situation in Mexico, but the drug war is hurting another important aspect of the economy: foreign investors are being scared off. Mexico's finance minister claims that the drug violence alone is reducing Mexico's GDP by 1% annually.

Corruption: one reason for the success of the cartels is their full use of the patron-client system that has thrived in Mexico. Police officers, government officials, and now even members of the military are being offered the choice of bribery or death. The pervasive corruption is weakening the political system and damaging the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people; and even worse, it's making it nearly impossible for the government to combat the cartels effectively.

Judiciary: the war is also exposing the flaws of this branch, proving that the system does not yet have an independent judiciary insulated from corruption. Bribery has neutralized the ability of judges to effectively convict cartel members and hold corrupt police and military officers accountable.

Human rights: both the cartels themselves and the government forces seeking to combat them have been guilty of committing human rights violations in Mexico. Drug-related homicides are becoming increasingly violent and gruesome. Authorities have used torture, illegal arrest, secret and prolonged detention, and fabrication of evidence. Questions over the true autonomy of the military have been raised. And the judiciary has proved unable to uphold basic tenets of human rights. Although Mexico is a relatively advanced nation and a developing democracy, it is facing severe human rights issues that may undermine the fabric of the system.